By Matthew Martin
An research of Sub-Saharan Africa's debt negotiations within the Nineteen Eighties. It offers a framework for assessing the most important kinds of debt negotiation, displaying that defective technique made agreements prone to failure, in order that no one used to be winning.
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Additional info for The Crumbling Façade of African Debt Negotiations: No Winners
Sample text
Hardliners also prevailed on the type of IMF loan for Nigeria. Top management and functional staff overruled AFR's creative ideas for avoiding a standby from January to June 1986. They cited US and FRG pressure for a standby to hide their own interest in inflexibility: they were anxious not to anger the Board (particularly the USA) by advocating creative ideas for nations with 'poor adjustment records'. The generally hardline management and Board attitude to African countries gave considerable leeway to a few dogmatic IMF staff, to adopt an in sensitive 'take it or leave it' attitude when presenting draft letters of intent to debtors.
Small farmers were potential supporters of measures such as agricultural producer price rises, but usually stood to gain less than large farmers, and were unorganised. Trade unions, students, academics, and the urban poor and middle classes almost always opposed IMF measures, believing they would cut already low living standards or social services, and would not work. In Zambia, trade unions had the power to lobby successfully during talks: they organised major strikes in 1983, 1984 and 1987, inducing the GRZ and IMF to agree higher wage rises.
Similarly, though Sudanese fiscal and monetary policies were 'highly distorted' and Zambia's 'moderately distorted' , Sudanese targets were much looser than (a) TheIMF 33 Zambian (also Brown, 1986; Callaghy in Ravenhill, 1986; and Leslie, 1987, on preferential treatment for the Sudan and Zaire). This lack of economic objectivity was not the fault of IMF staff: they initially ca1culated distortions, but several subjective factors intervened. The first was negotiation within IMF management. IMF staff agreed on the broad thrust of programmes, but beliefs and bureaucratic interests diverged on details of conditions, size of the IMF loan, and form of IMF approval of the package.