By James Kiras
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Additional info for Special Operations and the Nature of Strategy: From World War II to the War on Terrorism (Cass Series--Strategy and History)
Example text
The ascent of new technologies, superior decision making, and/or improved military means and methods such as special operations has led some theorists to conclude that the obstacles endemic to war and strategy are not only surmountable but irrelevant. In the same way that some equate the tactical success of an individual special operation with grossly disproportionate strategic effects, advocates of strategic paralysis assume that an identifiable center of gravity can be struck tactically with cascading effects that culminate in strategic collapse.
Boyd found that the superior performance of the Soviet aircraft was offset by the ability of American pilots to make faster transient maneuvers. Put simply, American pilots had a wider, clearer field of vision resulting from their larger canopies; they were more aware of their surroundings. 139 Boyd reasoned that success in fighter combat stemmed from superior maneuver, or agility, rather than advanced technology alone. 141 He also applied his ideas to fighter and simulator design. ”143 From Immelmanns to OODA loops If fighter combat was nothing more than a competition at the simplest level, Boyd reasoned that his theory could have wider application.
He understood that a “great captain” such as Napoleon or Alexander could easily undertake the task; such 22 Theories of strategic paralysis leaders, however, were all too rare historically. 59 Will, or moral force, was the true center of gravity in his estimation. Emerging technologies promised the means to avoid a prolonged battle of attrition. Tanks could pass through lines of resistance and aircraft could fly over them: If the shield is, however, not hacked to pieces, what shall we see? 61 Strategical paralysis would result from a combination of direct attacks against military leadership and civilian population targets in a short period of time.