By Jeremy Edwards, Klaus Fischer
This e-book presents a serious research of common claims concerning the benefits of the "bank-based" German approach of funding finance. the aim of the publication is to supply an analytical starting place for those claims, and to confront them with empirical proof from the German financial system within the postwar interval. The authors express that those claims aren't supported via the facts. this is often a massive discovering, because it unearths that there's no foundation for the view that the German procedure of funding finance is one who might be emulated via different nations.
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Extra info for Banks, Finance and Investment in Germany
It examines whether there is any evidence to support the view that representation on the supervisory boards of firms enables banks to supply a greater volume of loan finance to these firms. It also investigates whether representation on a firm's supervisory board gives a bank any competitive advantage in making loans to that firm, an important indication of whether in fact there exist any economies of scope between lending and supervisory board representation. These findings are also important for establishing whether there is in fact much scope for long-term commitments between banks andfirmsto arise as a result of the restrictions on competition involved in exclusive house bank relationships.
When there is a large number of small savers providing external finance to a firm, interpreting firm financing arrangements in terms of the theory of efficient incentive contracts encounters certain problems. This theory usually envisages a principal designing an incentive scheme for an agent (or agents). However, analysing firm finance along these lines requires making the assumption that suppliers of external finance are able to organise and agree among themselves in designing an incentive scheme, a process which, if there is a large number of suppliers of external finance, will involve considerable negotiation costs and free-rider problems.
These findings are also important for establishing whether there is in fact much scope for long-term commitments between banks andfirmsto arise as a result of the restrictions on competition involved in exclusive house bank relationships. Chapter 6 also investigates whether there is reliable evidence of more long-term lending in Germany than in the UK, and whether there is a clear theoretical basis for thinking that it is more efficient for a higher proportion of investment to be financed by long-term loans.